nominal GNP to the aggregate. It indicates the number of times each unit of nominal money "turns over" in producing this year's final output. This conclusion about the record decline in velocity was based on the fact that Ml growth had been rapid in the first quarter compared with what would have been predicted on the basis ofthe actual behavior ofnominal GNP and interest rates. This interpretation was supported by the growth in relatively lowinterest-yielding savings deposits. See "Record' (June 1982), pp. 366-67. and M2 as a guide to policy. Ultimately, it decided to suspend setting explicit growth objectives for Ml during the fourth quarter of the year. This article will review the factors affecting the long-and short-run policy decisions ofthe Committee during 1982, including those leading up to the decision to suspend setting an explicit target for Ml.
ANNUAL TARGETS FOR 1982
The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) requires the Board of Governors to transmit to Congress, each February and July, reports on the objectives for growth rate ranges for monetary and credit aggregates over the current calendar year and, in the case of the July report, over the following calendar year as well.
3 The
Committee has chosen to establish ranges from the fourth quarter of the previous year to the fourth quarter of the current year. 4
'~Theseranges must be reported to Congress each February and July, although the Act provides that the Board and the Committee may reconsider the annual ranges at any time. The period to which the annual ranges apply, however, may not he changed. The base period that the Committee has chosen (the fourth quarter of the previous year) would remain the same even if the Committee decided to change the desired growth rates of the aggregates for the year. 4 Before 1979, the Committee adopted one-year growth rates each quarter, and the base period for the annual targets announced each quarter was brought fonvard to the most recent quarter. This method resulted in a problem referred to as "base drift. 'Growth in aggregates above (below) an annual growth range in a quarter would raise (lower) the base level for calculating the next annual growth path. The specification of annual objectives in terms of calendar year growth rates, which eliminates the base drift problem within a calendar year, does not solve this problem from one calendar year to the next, since new ranges are established from the end of each calendar year.
Organization of the Committee in 1982
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At its February meeting, the Committee completed the review, begun at its December 1981 meeting, of the annual targets for the monetary and credit aggregates for 1982. It remained committed to its longstanding goal of restraining the growth of money and credit to reduce further the rate ofinflation, Nevertheless, Committee members disagreed about the precise ranges to set for the various monetary aggregates, Most members favored reaffirming the ranges for Ml that had been tentatively adopted at the July 1981 meeting. A substantial number, however, favored a somewhat higher range for M2 based on the belief that various developments during the year would likely boost the growth of M2 relative to Mi.
5 Also, it was generally agreed to give considerable weight to M2 in interpreting developments during the year. 6
5 At its midyear review of the annual ranges, the Committee establishes tentative ranges for the monetary aggregates for the next year -measured from the fourth quarter ofthe current year to the fourth quarter of the following year.
In setting its growth range for Ml, the Committee argued that the growth in "other checkable deposits," which had accelerated during January and which was in large part responsible for the rapid January growth of Mi, was likely to be temporary, and that the relationship between the Mi growth and the nominal GNP growth likely would be closer to its historical pattern during 1982. On this assumption, the Committee argued that it would be acceptable for Ml to grow at a rate near the upper end of its annual range during 1982. The Committee also expected that the growth of M2 would be high in its range, although somewhat below that of 198l.~At the end of the discussion, the Committee reaffirmed its tentative ranges for Ml and M2. These ranges are presented in table 1.
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aMessrs Black and Wallich dissented from this action because they favored specification of somewhat tower rates for monetary growth from March to June than those adopted by the Committee, which would be associated with a relatively prompt return of Ml growth to its range for the year Mr. Black bet ievod that continued growth of Ml above its ringer-run range tor any extended period wou 1 d adversely affect economic activity by exacerbating inflationary expectations and weakening markets for longer-term securities: for that reason, he felt that it was particularly important to resist any surge in growth of Ml that might develop ru April In Mr Wallich's opinion, it woufo be desirable to restrain the pace ot prospective recovery •n economic activity consistent with some reduction in the unemployment rate to sustain a degree of p'essure for the continuation of the reduction ill the underlying rate of inflation UMrs Teeters dissented from this action because she tavored specification ofsomewhat higher rates of monetary growth from March toJune with the objective of improving liquidity and easing financial pressures In her opinion, the time had come to foster lower and less variable interest rates in order to enhance prospects for significant recovery in output and employment. 'Messrs Black, Ford and Wallich dissented trom this action because they favored a policy for the perioo immeoiateiy ahead that was firmly directed toward bringing the growth of Ml down to its range for 1982 by the end of the year They were concerned that accommodation of relatively rapid growth over the summer months might eopardize achievement of the monetary objectives for the year and thus would risk exacerbating infiationary expectations. Accordingiy they believed that tenoencies toward rapid monetary expansion in the months immediately aheaa shouid be met by greater pressures on bank reserve positions and in the money market Mrs Teeters dissented from thrs action because she tavored specification of somewhat higher rates for monetary growth during the third quarter along with an approach to operations early in the period that would clearly sienal an easing in poicy In her opinion, policy at this point shoulo be oirected toward exerting downward pressure on short-term interest rates 'n order to promote recovery in output and employment. "Mr Wallich oisserited from this action because lie favored an approach to operations esily in the perioo that would iessen the chances ot short-term interest rates remair.'ng be'ow the prevailing discount rate or tai.ing further below it. He was concerned that such interest rate behavior wou~dtend to accelerate monetary expansion and that the neLessary restraint ot reserve growth to curb such expansion might 'ead to a sizable rebound in short-tern. tates with adverse implications for business ano consumer confidence 'Mr Black dissented from this action because he preferred to airec t operations n tne perioc in'mediately ahead toward restraining monetary growth Although he was mindful of the current oifliculties ot nterpreting the behav:or of Ml. he was conrerneo that the recent strength rn Ml might betoiioweo by sti-l more rapid growth nagged responsetothe substantiaideci'ne in short-terr interest ratesthat had occurred in the summer, which c.ouio requIre even more restrictive operations later. Mr Ford dissented from this action because he preferred a policy for tue period .mr"ediare.y ahead that was more firmly directeo' toward restraining monetary growth. athough he recogruzed that the benavior of Ml in palicular woulo be o~thcu't to interpret. He was concerned that the Committees policy directive might be misinterpreted in ways that couid adversely affect pursuit of the Systems longer-run anti-inflationary obtectives. particularly ri the context of a highiy expansive fiscal po'icy program Mrs Horn dissented from this act'on because she preferred to cont;nue setting a spec tic ob 1 ective for growth 01 Ml as we. as for M2 over the uurrent quaner 'iolwithstano:ng the priinlems ut iriterpretir'g its behavior In setting a target for Ml. she would to erate taster growth early in rho period, owing to the uncertain mpact ot the proceeds from maturng al-savers certificates, and woulo give greater weight IC) the behavior of M2 for some weeks a~erthe introduction of the new instrument at depository institutions 'Mi Ford dissenteo frc'm th,s action because he believed that it mr' the risk of complement ng very large budget delicits with substantial increases in the supply of morley In his view. the result wouid be an oveny stirnulat~vecomoination of policies that could re"cnde inflatior and drive up interest rates during 1983°M r Black dissented because he preferred to d~rectpolicy in the weeks immediately ahead toward ensuring that the growth of Ml abstracting from temporary effects o t the introduction of new money marker oeposit accounts. would moderate troni the extremeiy rapid rare ot recent months Wlule recognizing ttie difficulties in interpreting Ml currerit.y. he was concerned that excessive underying growth in that aggregate might reverse the progress achieved in reoucing ir'f.ation arid inflationary expectations and lead to substantiai'y weaker markets tor long-term securities Mr Ford dissentec from this action because be continued to prefer a po icy br the current period that was more firmly directed toward resiraining monetary growth. after a:lowance for the short-run mpact of the introduction o' new money market deposit accounts He remained concerned that rapid expansion n the supply of money together wth very 'argo budget deiic'ts wouid produce an overly stimalalive comoinatron of poltcies that could rekindle inflation and inflationary expectations and lead to higher interest rates ouring 1983 and 1984 "Mrs Teeters dissented from this action because she believed that somewhat higher monetary growth over the year ahead was needed to promoteadequateexpansion in economic activityand a reduction inthe iateot unemployment Specifically. she t 0 vored a rangefor Ml that was at least .'.. percentage point higher than that adopted by the comrr;ittee arid a range for M2 that provided for somewhat greater growth ;n the broader aggregate retative to that in Ml Mrs Teeters dissented from this action because she favored an explicit statement that growth of Ml above the upper end of the Committee's range tori 982 by 1 percentage point, or even as much as 1'' percentage points niight be acceptable In her oplnion. it was mportant to ind~catethe acceptable degree 01 growth ot Ml above the range in oroer to foster market behavior that woulo lower interest rates and enhance the prospects br sustainng recovery in output and employment. Ml is defined as currency plus private demand deposits and other checkable deposits at depository institutions exclusive of deposits due to foreign commercial banks ano officiab institutions, plus travelers checks of non-bank issuers. M2 is M' plus savings and small-denomination time deposits at au depository institutions, shares in money market mutual funds overnight repurchase agreements issued by commercial banks and overnight Eurodollar deposits held by U S. residents at Caribbean branches of U.S banks M3 is M2 plus large time deposits at all depository institutions and term repurchase agreements issued by commercial banks and savings and loan associations 2 Data as revised by Board of Governors in January 1g83
Actual Money Growth in 1982
As shown in table 2, all three ofthe monetary aggregates exceeded their target ranges during 1982.8 Their patterns of growth relative to their ranges, however, were considerably different, as can be seen in chart 1. Both Ml and M2 were above their targeted ranges nearly all of the year. In contrast, M3 growth was within its range during the first half of 1982 and above it during the second half.
Although both Ml and M2 were above their target ranges throughout the year, their growth rates displayed different patterns. While the quarter-toquarter growth of M2 during 1982 was less stable than that of 1981, it was stable compared with the quarterto-quarter growth of Ml. Ml grew rapidly in January and was fairly flat until July, when it began a growth spurt that accelerated markedly in October. This pattern of Ml growth was basically consistent with the Committee's short-run objectives for the year.
SHORT.~RUNPOLICY DIRECTIVES FOR 1982
The announced annual target ranges for the monetary aggregates provide a basis on which the FOMC 5 The definition of M2 was changed effective Februar 14, 1983, to include tax-exempt money market ftmds and to exclude all IRA) Keogh balances at depository institutions and money market mutual funds. These changes also affi~ctedM3. Thus, data available January 20, 1983, were used. The growth rates ofMl, M2 and M3 will differ from those reported from revisions after February 14, 1983. chooses its short-run policy objectives during the year. The short-run policy directives, however, are the ones that influence the day-to-day implementation of monetary policy. The Committee issues these directives for implementation by the Manager of the Open Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
During 1982, the Committee specified short-run growth rates for Ml, M2 and M3.°It also specified intermeeting ranges for the federal funds rate as a mechanism for initiating further consultations in periods between regularly scheduled meetings. These intermeeting ranges and the actual federal funds rate are presented in chart 2. The growth rate targets for the monetary aggregates and the intermeeting ranges for the federal funds rate that the Committee specified during 1982 appear in table 1.
As in the previous year, discussions pertaining to short-run policy decisions in 1982 were marked by considerable uncertainty about both the effect of various regulatory changes and financial innovations on the growth rates of the monetary aggregates and the 9 The short-run growth rate target for Ml was dropped at the October meeting and a short-run target for M3 was introduced. 10 ff movements of the federal funds rate within the range appear to be inconsistent with the short-run objectives for the monetary aggregates and related reserve paths during the intermeeting period, the Manager of Domestic Operations at the Federal Reserve Bank of~'1ewYork is to notify the Chairman, who in turn decides whether the situation calls for supplementary instructioim from the Committee. relative weight that should be given to Ml and tv12 in implementing the Committee's short-run policy decisions. 1 ' Indeed, the relative importance of M2 and
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Ml for short-run policy purposes shifted during the year.
Nevertheless, just as in 1981, short-run movements in the aggregates during 1982 followed their short-run target paths. This correspondence between the target paths and actual growth of the aggregates is illustrated in chart 3, which shows the short-run target ranges and actual levels of Ml and M2, respectively, based on first-published data. First-published data give a more accurate representation of the Committee's short-run policy decisions based on information available at the time.' 2 Chart 3 shows that short-run targets for Ml were specified only for the first three quarters of the year. During its October meeting, the Committee decided to place much less weight than usual on the narrow aggregate and not set a specific objective for its growth. At this time, the Committee began setting short-run targets for M3.
First Qua-rter
The short-run targets for the first quarter of 1982 were made against a backdrop ofrapid expansion in M2 and Ml from November 1981. The growth of both monetary aggregates accelerated during January 1982, especially that of Ml. The Committee believed that the rapid growth in the demand for components of Ml would abate during the ensuing months. It noted that if 
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NOV. DEC. such a decline were not forthcoming, the income velocity ofMl would decline at a postwar record rate, based on the then-projected growth of nominal GNP for the first quarter. Thus, the Committee established growth paths for Ml and M2 that, if achieved, would move these aggregates closer to the upper limit of their annual target ranges. Specifically, the Committee sought no further growth in Ml from January to March and growth ofM2 at an annual rate ofaround 8 percent.
It was agreed that some decline in Ml would be acceptable in the context of reduced pressures in the money market) 3
Second Quarter
Continued uncertainty about the relative behavior of Ml and M2 marked the short-run policy decisions for the second quarter. Staffanalysis continued to suggest that the demand for money might be expected to moderate significantly in the second quarter. Furthermore, the Committee was concerned that technical problems associated with the federal income tax deadline in April might result in an April bulge in Ml growth. It was understood that most, if not all, of the Ml growth for the second quarter might occur during April. 14 Given these technical factors and given uncertainties about near-term economic prospects and other factors affecting the monetary aggregates, most members of the Committee favored actions that would permit modest growth in Ml over the second quarter. Thus, the Committee set a short-run target for Ml of about 3 percent, while maintaining the short-run target growth rate for M2 at its first-quarter rate. Furthermore, it noted that deviations from these targets should be evaluated in the light that M2 was less likely than Ml to be affected by deposit shifts and technical factors over the second quarter. la
Third Quarter
In setting its short-run objectives for the third quarter, the Committee noted that the growth of Ml and ' 3 See "Record" (April 1982 ), p. 234. 11 See "Record" (June 1982 , p. 368. ' 5 The Committee reevaluated its position for the second quarter at its May meeting. Most members agreed that somewhat more rapid growth of Ml might he acceptable if it appeared to be associated with a continued desire of the public to build up liquidity, and if the growth of M2 was near its specified range. See "Record" (July 1982), p. 420. M2 for the whole period from March to June appearc to be in line with its objectives for that period (see cha 3). The Committee was increasingly pessimistic, hov ever, about the outlook for the economy, and it coi tinued to be concerned about the uncertainty over tli public's demand for liquidity and precautionaiy ba ances. Additionally, it was concerned that the midyer eduction in withholding rates for federal income tax and the scheduled cost-of-living increase in socis ecurity payments would lead to a bulge in Ml dunn July. After a discussion of these factors, most of ii Committee members agreed that they would accel somewhat faster monetary growth in the third quarte ifthe demand for liquidity and precautionary balance did not ease as anticipated. Thus, the Committe voted for faster growth for both Ml and M2 from th second to the third quarter, increasing the Ml targe from about 3 percent to about 5 percent and increasin the M2 target from about 8 percent to about percent.D
e-ernpha.~rizingMl
At the October meeting, when the short-run objec tives for the fourth quarter were first considered, number of new considerations concerning the state c the economy and financial markets emerged. Th Committee was concerned that the general worsenin of the world economy and financial problems associ ated with large accumulated external debts of develop ing countries in recent years had contributed to a atmosphere of uncertainty that was reflected in th 1 exchange value of the dollar, among other things. This in turn, had serious implications for U.S. export indus tries and for the ability of foreign governments to pur sue flexible monetary policies. Also, the Committei was concerned that the U.S. banking system had beei subjected to pressures associated with the general un easiness about further credit problems both domesti cally and internationally. The result was a genera widening of risk premiums, with interest rates on pri vate securities generally falling less than the rates or Treasury issues from July to September. It noted tha short-term interest rates had tended to move up in th weeks just before the meeting. Furthermore, the com mittee noted that the widely held expectations o a spring or summer recovery had been disappointed and there_were no signs of a strengthening in th economy.
'°Threemembers dissented from this action because they fiwored policy of bringing growth of Ml down to its range for 1982 by year-end, See It was believed that the maturing all-savers certificates would induce a temporary increase in Ml, while the new money market deposit accounts (MM DAs) would depress Ml growth upon their introduction. Because of these conflicting effects, the Committee believed it would be difficult to interpret movements in Ml during the months ahead. ' 9 It acknowledged that the new accounts also would affect the growth of M2; however, it believed that M2 and the broader aggregates would be affected to a much smaller extent than Ml. Therefore, it decided to set no specific objectives for Ml growth for the fourth quarter, to increase the weight given to M2 and to set short-run policy objectives for M3.
At the November meeting, the Committee acknowledged that the bulge in Ml growth, which it had anticipated, had persisted longer than some members expected, but staffanalysis suggested Ml growth could be expected to decelerate over the remainder of the fourth quarter. It was noted, however, that growth of both Ml and M2 could accelerate in the near term due to a buildup of balances for eventual placement in the new MMDAs.
2°T he Committee concluded that some- what slower growth in M2 for the fourth quarter would be desirable if such growth were associated with a decline in market interest rates, and that somewhat faster growth would be tolerated if exceptional liquidity demands persisted. Once again, the Committee decided not to set specific policy objectives for Ml.
The growth ofM2 during the fourth quarter was very near the Committee's short-run objective (see chart 3). The growth of Ml, however, was extremely rapid, growing at an annual rate of nearly 14 percent. This rapid fourth-quarter growth of Ml resulted in a fourthquarter-to-fourth-quarter growth rate of 8.5 percent, well above the upper end of the long-run target range for the year.
SUMMARY
As in 1981, the FOMC argued that a number of financial developments and innovations continued to make it difficult to interpret movements in the two principal monetary aggregates, Ml and M2, during 1982. From the beginning ofthe year, the Committee believed that M2 was less likely to be affected by these factors than Ml. This opinion was bolstered by unusual declines in the income velocity of Ml during the first and fourth quarters of 1982. It was generally felt that considerable weight should be given to M2 in interpreting developments during the year. The Committee increased the weight given to M2 during the year, ultimately dropping Ml as an explicit intermediate policy target for the fourth quarter.
Nevertheless, the growth of both Ml and M2 followed the short-run growth objectives of the Committee fairly closely during the year. Growth of Ml was near the Committee's short-run path until the fourth quarter, when short-run growth objectives for the aggregate were dropped. Actual growth of M2 was near the Committee's desired short-run path for the entire year. Rapid fourth-quarter growth of Ml, however, pushed its growth well above the Committee's long-run range. 
